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Is God Good? Aquinas, Śaṃkara, Abhinavagupta, Balinese
Śaivism, and the Problematics of the Argument from Evil
Lance E. Nelson
University of San Diego
I have long thought that comparative theology
could make important contributions to the
perennial discussion of “the problem of evil,” or
more specifically in the present case, the
modern “argument from evil.”1 As an argument
against the existence of God, the latter was first
forcefully articulated by philosophers of the
Enlightenment.2 As is well known, however, its
importance continues to the present day. It has
long been considered “the most powerful
objection to traditional theism.”3
The problem of evil—as opposed to the
argument from evil—is an ancient one, but it
was not initially formulated as an argument in
support of atheism. God’s existence was taken
for granted, and on that basis thinkers like
Augustine engaged an serious intellectual
struggle with deep questions about the divine
raised by the presence of evil in the world: the
unicity of God, the knowability of God, the
possibility of Divine providence.4 The atheist
argument from evil—especially as expounded of
late by the New Atheists--tends to reduce this
history to a caricature.

The question of God’s goodness is what I
want to focus on in this paper. What exactly
“good” means in this context is often
extraordinarily ambiguous. Nevertheless, the
assumed meaning nowadays seems to be that
God is morally good. Richard Dawkins, in his book
The God Delusion, remarks, “It is childishly easy to
overcome the problem of evil. Simply postulate
a nasty god.”5 Must the God of monotheism
therefore necessarily be a “nice” God, as
Dawkins seems to imply?6 One problem with this
formulation is that it takes for granted that God
is a moral agent that can be judged, and found
wanting, by the same sort of external standards
that we apply in judging other human beings. Is
this uniformly the case in the Christian
tradition? What about thinkers and mythmakers in other religious traditions?
In exploring a small aspect of this question
here, I will be working with Aquinas, Śaṃkara
and the Advaita tradition, and Abhinavagupta
and the nondual Śaivism of Kashmir. I will also
refer briefly to Balinese Hinduism, an
interesting expression of pre-Abhinava Śaivism.
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Aquinas—though he has a lot to day about
God, good, and evil—does not seriously engage
the atheist argument from evil. Śaṃkara was
aware of the challenge of atheism, and he does
offer a theodicy, but it is a preliminary one, not
representing his final view. Abhinavagupta and
his tradition, in terms of theological discourse,
have scarcely anything to say on evil as it might
problematize conceptions of God, for it seems to
them not a problem, though the Śaiva mythic
corpus speaks in its own way. For Hindus in Bali,
the idea that God is good is taken to be
simplistic.
To be clear, my concern here is not any
solution to the problem of evil as such, but
rather the prior question of God’s goodness. In
particular, I’m interested in whether or not God
is properly considered to be morally good in a
way that the modern argument from evil
assumes that God, if God exists, must necessarily
be.7 My basic proposition is that, for the writers
and ways of thought I’m looking at, God is
precisely not morally good, in the sense that any
moral standards we use in judging our fellow
human beings are not properly applied to God.
It should be, I hope, obvious that this does not
mean that these traditions think of God as
immoral; for these writers God is—in a word—
transmoral.
Aquinas
As it happens, Aquinas offers what Hickson
suggests is an early prototype of the argument
from evil.8 Prior to this occurrence, Hickson can
identify no discussion of evil aimed directly at
disproving the existence of God (as opposed to
provoking reflection on the unity or knowability
of God or gods, or divine providence, or such
questions). But Hickson is not at all sure that
Aquinas took this argument seriously. He thinks,
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rather, that it was included as a prima facie view,
according to the Aristotelian-Scholastic formula
for such disputations, which required an initial
statement of objection.9 In any event, here it is:
It seems that there is no God. For if one of
two contraries were infinite, the other
would be completely destroyed. But by the
word 'God' we understand a certain infinite
good. So, if God existed, nobody would ever
encounter evil. But we do encounter evil in
the world. So, God does not exist. (Summa
Theologiae 1a.2.3)10
We do not have space to dwell on this
example here. Neither, it seems, did Aquinas. As
Hickson points out, Aquinas dispatched it in two
sentences. But let us note in passing that this is
a metaphysical, not a moral argument: there
cannot be room for two infinite realities that are
assumed to be contraries. What it specifically
does not offer as a premise is the supposed moral
goodness of God.
I would suggest that one important reason
for this is that while Aquinas, with the rest of the
Christian tradition, certainly thinks of God as
good, he does not define that goodness in moral
terms. Thus we read:
The goodness of something consists in its
being desirable. Hence Aristotle's dictum
that ‘good is what everything desires’. But
desirability evidently follows upon
perfection, for things always desire their
perfection. (Summa Theologiae Ia.5.1)11
So goodness is defined in terms of
desirability and perfection. On that basis,
Aquinas proceeds to argue for (1) the goodness
of God, (2) for God as the supreme good, and (3)
that only God is essentially good—but none of
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this in terms of God’s morality. The discussion,
as Stump characterizes it, is meta-ethical.12
God is certainly the cause of moral goodness
in his creatures, but he is not himself a being
that is possessed of moral virtues as humans are
and that humans can understand. Neither is God
subject to external moral obligations. As Brian
Davies argues, Aquinas would consider any
discussion of the “moral integrity” of God to be
seriously misplaced.13 Aquinas is certainly aware
that scripture and tradition have used words
like “just,” “truthful,” “loving,” “merciful” and,
yes, “good” in reference to God.14 As is well
known, however, Aquinas believes such
attributions are analogical. He does not take
them to mean that God possesses these qualities
in anything close to the way in which humans
do.
While, like Augustine, Aquinas had a good
deal to say about God and evil, he had, as Davies
points out forcefully, pretty much nothing to
say on “what contemporary philosophers have
come to call the problem of evil.”15 It would not
have occurred to him that God’s goodness would
be a matter of adjudication in terms of standards
of morality applicable to human beings. Aquinas
scholar Herbert McCabe puts it dramatically: “It
is blasphemous nonsense to say that God is
wicked, but it is equally inappropriate to say
that he is morally good. . . . Moral good and evil
belong to rational beings that achieve or fail to
achieve perfection.”16
Śaṃkara and the Advaita Tradition
In querying the goodness of Brahman, the
ultimate reality in Advaita Vedānta, the first
word that comes to mind is sat and its cognates,
sattā and satya. These terms are often used to
characterize or define Brahman. Sat in some
contexts can mean “good.” More commonly,
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certainly in Advaita discourse, it would properly
be translated “truth,” “reality,” or simply
“existence” or “being,” in a purely ontological
sense.17
Śaṃkara’s definition of sat is quite simple: it
is that which does not change (na vyabhicarati).18
Alternately, in the standard formulation of the
later tradition, sat is defined as that which is
never sublated by some higher knowledge in
past, present, or future (tri-kāla-abhādya). I am
not aware of Śaṃkara or his followers using sat
in the sense of “goodness”—certainly not “moral
goodness”—in relation to Brahman. Nor, for that
matter, am I aware of any passages in the
Upaniṣads where sat could be construed in this
way in relation to Brahman. When paired, sat
and asat must invariably be translated as being
and nonbeing; satya is contrasted with anṛta, as
“truth and untruth.” The concern is
predominantly ontological and epistemological,
albeit within a wider axiological and
soteriological framework.
The word satya figures in the famous
“definition” of Brahman found at Taittirīya
Upaniṣad 2.1.1: satyaṃ jnanam anantam brahma
(“Brahman is real, knowledge, infinite”).
Śaṃkara glosses satyam as “not changing,” so
that the verse comes out, through lakṣaṇārtha
(proximate secondary predication), as a bit of
negative theology, “Brahman is what is not
changing, not unreal, not unconscious, not
limited.”19 This negative theology, of course,
finds its primary scriptural justification at
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.3.6, “This Self is
spoken of as, ‘Not thus, not thus’ (neti neti).” For
Śaṃkara, this legitimates the ruthless
discarding of limiting attributions (upādhi) in
thinking about Brahman.
There are any number of passages that point
to Brahman as transcending all distinctions
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(dvandvātīta), including what in English might be
called the morally good and bad. Brahman, the
Self, or the liberated sage (which are equivalent)
are said in the Upaniṣads to be beyond both
morality (dharma) and immorality (adharma),
the desirable (priya) and the undesirable
(apriya), good deeds (sukṛta) and bad (duṣkṛta),
merit (puṇya) and sin (pāpa).20 Dramatically,
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.3.22 declares: “There,
a thief is not a thief, the murderer of a Brahmin
is not a murderer of a Brahmin.” Given that
Brahminicide is arguably the most heinous
crime in this particular universe of meaning,
this is a powerful statement indeed.
In short, it would be hard to support any
claim as to the moral goodness, or otherwise, of
Brahman in classical Advaita.21 It seems clear
that for this tradition Brahman is, as has often
been said, “beyond good and evil.”22
Nevertheless, there are several passages
dealing with theodicy in the Brahmasūtra. In
commenting on one of these Śaṃkara is forced
to defend the goodness of Brahman, indeed the
moral goodness of Brahman as a moral agent.
What are we to make of this?
Brahmasūtra 2.1.34 famously raises the
question of whether Brahman, if regarded as the
cause of the world, might be guilty of partiality
(vaiṣamya) or even cruelty (nairghṛṇya) because
of the different experiences and the suffering of
his creatures. Śaṃkara rises to the defense of
God in the face of his objector’s accusation that
the Lord (īśvara) has created an unjust world
(viṣamāṃ sṛṣṭim). “Owing to infliction of misery
and destruction on all creatures,” Śaṃkara’s
pūrvapakṣin, or objector, charges, “the Lord will
be open to the charge of extreme cruelty,
abhorred even by the wicked.”23 Here, it is clear
that the Lord is being judged by external moral
standards, ordinary human standards, as one
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would judge another human person. Śaṃkara
accepts these terms, jumps into the fray, and
defends the Lord. God, he says, cannot be
accused of partiality or injustice because he is
simply allotting to individuals the experiences
they have earned by their karma.24
It is significant, however, that in an earlier
passage, commenting on Brahmasūtra 2.1.21-22,
Śaṃkara had already taken the argument in
quite a different direction. There, he defends
Brahman against the charge of failing to do what
is good, not with the argument that the divine
allocates experience on the basis of individuals’
karma, but on the basis that Brahman does not
really do anything at all: “The defects of not
doing what is beneficial and so on cannot apply,
because [for Brahman] there is nothing
beneficial (hita) to be done nor harmful (ahita) to
be avoided, since Brahman is eternally liberated
by nature.” Śaṃkara makes clear that in this
context he is talking from the paramārtika
viewpoint, the perspective of absolute truth, in
which the “creatorhood of Brahman”
(brahmaṇas sraṣṭṛtvam) has been “sublated by
right knowledge,” along with all “dualistic
dealings, brought about by false ignorance.” He
continues: “Then, in that state, where can
creation come from, and from where such
defects as the failure to do that which is
beneficial?” In short, he is saying that the
supreme, nirguṇa Brahman is not accountable to
any human standards, that indeed, Brahman, in
itself, is neither a creator nor an agent of any
action. From this point of view, the problem of
unjust suffering in the world is easily solved:
“From the absolute perspective,” Śaṃkara
writes, “saṃsāra does not exist” (saṃsāro na tu
paramārthato ‘sti).25
My conclusion: Śaṃkara is willing to
champion the moral goodness of Brahman, or
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Īśvara, at a provisional—could we say
analogical?—level of discourse, pertaining to the
apara (lower) or saguṇa (qualified) Brahman.
However, he would emphatically deny any
conceptualization of moral goodness (or
depravity) in relation to the supreme or para
Brahman.
Abhinavagupta and Kashmir Śaivism
The Śaiva nondualism of Kashmir, as
articulated most prominently by the great
polymath Abhinavagupta, is a different sort of
nondualism than Śaṃkara’s Advaita. It could be
called a nondualism by inclusion, since the
world is celebrated as contained within the
Divine, rather than a nondualism by exclusion,
which achieves unity by dismissing the world.
(Recall Śaṃkara’s assertion, just above, of the
ultimate non-existence of saṃsāra.) This could
be termed a cosmic monism, as opposed to the
classical Advaitin’s acosmic monism. For
Abhinava, the concept of a static, completely
transcendent absolute contradicts the glorious
independence (svātantrya) of the Lord to
manifest at will a world that is not different
from himself as, to use an analogy commonly
employed in the tradition, images are not
different from the mirror in which they appear.
The Kashmir Śaiva adept correspondingly exults
in her or his complete identity with God.
While concern is expressed—sometimes in
quite dramatic terms—that the “secrets” of
Śaiva teaching are not be revealed to those who
are sinful (pāpa) or devoid of morality (dharmahīna),26 those teachings, especially the secret
ones, are unabashedly transmoral—and in some
cases famously transgressive. If discussion of
conventional ethical concerns is infrequent in
Śaṃkara, it is even more difficult to find in
Abhinavagupta’s Śaivism. Indeed—as is well
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known—those adhering to ordinary morality are
compared to “sheep” (paśu),27 in contrast with
the spiritual elect, who are termed heroes (vīra).
This is a complex tradition with multiple
streams. One place of entrée is the prominent
identification in Kashmir Śaivism of Paramaśiva,
the supreme Śiva, as Bhairava, the “Frightful” or
“Horrific.”28 Abhinavagupta is regarded by
tradition as an incarnation of Bhairava, and he
is said to have departed from this world by
entering into the Bhairava-guhā, “Bhairava’s
cave,” not far from Srinagar, reciting the
Bhairava Stava, a hymn (said to be his own
composition) to the Deity in that form.29 An
important conceptualization of liberation in this
tradition is as bhairavaikātmya, “identity with
Bhairava.”30
Now, prior to and to a real extent even after
this Deity’s adoption by Kashmir Śaiva Brahmins
as a primary symbol of the ultimate, Bhairava
was a terrifying God, associated with “the
ascetic cremation-ground culture of heterodox
and transgressive groups who sought power
through control of and possession by hordes of
frightening goddesses.”31 Bhairava encompasses
with his horrific, fanged appearance and
associations the religion of the tantric vīra, the
hero who laughs at the pain and suffering of this
world, seeing it as a product of ignorance.
Suffering can be “devoured,” or transformed by
the power of supreme consciousness, with
which the adept has identified. In his “Hymns in
Imitation of Bhairava” (Bhairavānukaraṇastava),
Abhinava’s disciple Kṣemarāja praises Bhairava
thus: “Lord! By wearing bones and the rosary
made of hands and heads, and shining with the
human blood, you instruct that the world is pure
because it is of the nature of Brahman.”32
As is well-known, this attitude toward the
world was ritualized in the secret, transgressive

5

Journal of Hindu-Christian Studies, Vol. 29 [2016], Art. 3

Is God Good? Aquinas, Śaṃkara, Abhinavagupta, Balinese Śaivism 9
rites described in Abhinava’s Tantrāloka 29 and
elsewhere. This approach aims at a
consciousness “free of the contraction of laws,
untouched by injunction or prohibition.”33 In
the end, it seeks what Sanderson has called a
“mystic vision of fearless omnipotence.”34 The
practitioner identifies with Svacchanda
Bhairava, the “Lord of the vīras” (vīra-nāyaka),
the God who “devours everything” (sarvabhakṣa).35
God’s responsibility for the joy and suffering
of creatures is not here avoided or denied;
rather, it is celebrated. Bhairava is described in
the Bahurūpagarbha Stotra, a section of the
Svacchanda Tantra, as the “bestower of the
experience of the terrifying saṃsāra” (ghorasaṃsāra-saṃbhoga-dāyine). He is the one who
“bestows exceedingly terrible experiences in
saṃsāra” (ghora-ghora-saṃsāra-dayine).36 The
Stavacintāmaṇi declares that God’s power
(sāmarthya) is sufficient to allot worldly
experiences and liberation to individuals
without dependence on any external factor
whatsoever
(ananyāpekṣa).37
Doniger’s
observation that “in Hinduism, evil (like good) is
an integral part of God and stems from him”38
certainly applies to nondual Saivism.
Śaivism in Bali
In exploring some examples of religious
outlooks that do not insist on the moral
goodness of the Supreme Being, it is worth a
short excursus on the Hinduism of Bali. There,
as earlier in Java, a pre-Abhinavagupta form of
Saivism took root and, though today under
multiple threats political and otherwise, still
flourishes, in ritual expressions especially, but
also in secret texts, the lontars, preserved by
village Brahmins.39
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In a thought-provoking article entitled “Is
God Evil?” the anthropologist Mark Hobart
describes a conversation with Balinese
informants:
Late one evening after a long discussion
with a group of villagers, in which they
commented on how many contradictions
and inconsistencies their beliefs seemed to
contain, I remarked that we too had our
puzzles. In Christianity there was a paradox
that, if God were good, omnipotent and
omniscient, how could evil exist? To my
surprise I was met with hoots of laughter.
White people seemed so clever. How could
they find difficult what was so obvious, even
to simple villagers who could not read or
write? One of them explained the matter to
me, to mutters of agreement from the
others. Of course God—in Bali Sang Hyang
Widi, the highest, all-embracing Divinity—
was bad (kaon). How else could there be bad
in the world?40
The idea that the Deity can manifest in
terrible forms is of course well attested in India
itself. I might venture to say, however, based on
my own informal experience in both India and
Indonesia, that the Balinese on the whole
remain more readily disposed to embrace such
conceptions than contemporary Hindus. It is
well-known in Balinese lore that God has a
wrathful (pemurtian) aspect.41 The ambivalent
nature of God in Bali has been explored in
several interesting articles by Michelle Stephen,
who undertook a study of myths of Śiva and Umā
recorded in Balinese manuscripts. She
concluded that these texts “revealed nothing
less than that all destructive and dangerous
forces in the world originate from the divine
pair themselves, and that the aim of human
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ritual is primarily to cause these destructive
forces to return to their original benign
condition.”42
Conclusion
In these remarks, I have not intended to
address theodicy or propose any new
“solutions” that might save anyone’s faith from
the atheists’ argument from evil. Nevertheless, I
hope what I have said will make a modest
contribution to the discussion by raising a
particular, limited question regarding that
argument. If proponents of atheism, whether
new or old, think that they have dealt religion a
fatal blow using an argument that assumes that
theists universally suppose that God is (morally)
good, they are ignoring the wider evidence. If

believers, on the other hand, feel their faith
threatened by such arguments, it may be that a
broader conception of God’s goodness is called
for. As McCabe suggests, there is always a
chance, “We may find, as Job did, that it was our
own view of God that was infantile, [and thus]
we may in fact come to a deeper understanding
of the mystery of God.”43
I have found the distinction between the
atheist argument from evil and the reflective—
or aporetic44—problem of evil to be most helpful.
The latter seems not so much a threat to
faith as a question for contemplative struggle, at
least to the extent that it focuses the mind on
the mysteries of life and God.
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